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Ignition source isolation is a safety system used in the oil and gas industry to minimize the
probability that hydrocarbon leaks from the process are ignited.
In order to determine risk levels across the installation, the expected effectiveness or reliability of
this system must be evaluated.
Problem statement for this thesis work is as follows:
   1. Construct a model of the process by which a piece of equipment in a hazardous area
successfully ignites hydrocarbon gas.
   2. Using this model and available data from the industry, develop a set of weighing factors for
equipment types commonly found in the process area to account for their relative contribution to
the overall ignition probability.
   3. Apply the above to a module on an actual oil and gas installation in order to estimate the
effectiveness of the isolation system. That is, how much does it reduce the overall ignition
probability.
Assignment given: 01. February 2010









This thesis work was a study into how the effectiveness of ignition source isolation can be 
estimated. This safety system works by isolating electrical equipment from power when 
flammable gas is detected on oil and gas installations. Improving the understanding of how 
effective this system actually is at reducing explosion risk in hazardous areas was the main 
motivation, as this could help operators and authorities form a more accurate risk picture. 
The main part of the work is the development and discussion of a model for ignition that was 
made so that it could be used to estimate this effectiveness. A detailed model is presented 
first, based on evaluating failure modes of equipment, then suggestions are made for how it 
could be simplified to be of practical use in risk analysis. 
The second part of the project was to gather enough data from industry sources to be able to 
estimate key parameters in the model relating to the failure probability of Ex barriers and the 
ignition probability resulting from common types of process equipment. Not enough data was 
found to support a quantification of these parameters, but results from a major maintenance 
project on an oil and gas installation in the Norwegian sector was reviewed and discussed. 
The method of systematically evaluating failure modes in order to determine risk could be 
useful in other applications, and the suggested way to proceed with the work in this report is 
to continue gathering data and analyzing it to build up a credible set of failure probabilities for 
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1.  Introduction 
1.1. General 
Ignition source isolation is a safety system in common usage in any industries where 
explosive atmospheres could form. It aims to reduce explosion risk by electrical isolation of 
any equipment that could ignite the atmosphere, and is predicated on detection of the 
explosive atmosphere. The principle is applicable to hydrocarbon gas clouds such as can be 
formed from process leaks in the oil and gas industry as well as to explosive dust clouds or 
flammable mists.  
The main motivation for studying the reliability of this system comes from risk analysis in the 
oil and gas industry. The ability to accurately assess the risk levels on platforms and 
installations is important both to operators in the industry and to the regulatory authorities. 
With the recent catastrophic loss of life and environmental damage resulting from the accident 
on the Deepwater Horizon, there is increased attention to risks in this industry from the public 
as well. That accident and other well-known incidents such as the Piper Alpha catastrophe 
escalated because leaked gas from the process came into contact with an ignition source and 
exploded. 
While it is clear that ignition source isolation reduces the probability of an explosion, we are 
not aware of any studies done that have conclusively quantified how much of an effect it has 
on ignition probabilities. The main goal of this project then is to develop a model that can be 
used to estimate the effectiveness of ignition source isolation and to find data from industry 
sources that can be used to quantify the parameters of that model.  
In this chapter we reference previous work on the subject, present a more detailed scope of 
work for the project and outline the structure of this report.  
1.2.  Previous work 
In the Norwegian sector there have been two projects aiming to develop an ignition model for 
use in risk analysis, JIP-97 and OLF-2004 /4/. OLF-2004 was an update to the major joint 
industry project JIP-97, aiming to refine the model and ignition probabilities using more up to 
date data on releases. Both models had in common that the model parameters were estimated 
by using experienced releases and ignitions. Ignition sources were not individually modeled, 
rather a generic ignition probability per cubic meter of process equipment was assumed. The 
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suggested value for the effectiveness  of ignition source isolation was 0.75, which fit well 
with the accident data but was not based on a study into how the system performs at any level 
of detail. 
In winter 2009, the effectiveness of ignition source isolation was studied by this author, using 
a module on an FPSO under construction for the Norwegian sector as a case study /7/. In that 
project much effort was spent on understanding how ignition source isolation was physically 
and technically carried out. In the end the effectiveness was estimated using a simple method 
that did not take into account how different ignition sources have varying probability of 
igniting gas. A more refined method using weighting factors for different categories of 
ignition sources was suggested, but there was insufficient time in the project to develop 
credible weighting factors.  
1.3. Scope of work 
This project consists of three distinct steps: 
1. Literature review. In this part of the project we shall survey existing literature on 
ignition phenomenon and electrical equipment for hazardous areas. The goal is to 
develop a working understanding of ignition and get familiarized with the various 
techniques that exist for constructing electrical equipment so that it can be operated 
safely in hazardous areas. 
2. Modeling. First a detailed model of how electrical equipment ends up igniting 
hydrocarbon gas clouds should be developed. The goal is to set up the model as a 
series of analytical expressions for ignition from electrical equipment that can be used 
to evaluate the effectiveness of ignition source isolation. We should then look into 
ways to simplify the model so that it has an appropriate level of detail for use in risk 
analysis. 
3. Data collection and analysis. In order to be able to establish model parameters, we are 
dependent on data that could be used to quantify ignition probabilities. The strategy 
here is to approach operators and other companies in the industry and ask them to 
contribute failure data for their equipment and other relevant data such as studies on 
ignition probabilities. We should then analyze the data and discuss how it can be 




1.4. Structure of this report 
• In chapters two and three we review and summarize information on the ignition 
phenomenon and on explosion prevention techniques respectively.  
• In chapter four we develop a model aimed at estimating the effectiveness of ignition 
source isolation.  
• Chapter five is dedicated to the discussion of the model, the assumptions behind it and 
the parameters used in it.  
• In chapter six we review and analyze the data found and discuss how it can be used to 
set model parameters. 
• Chapter seven is the final chapter and contains discussion, concluding remarks and 
suggestions for further work. 
2.  Ignition by electrical equipment 
2.1.  General 
This chapter briefly reviews the theory behind ignition of gases and summarizes the two ways 
in which electrical equipment can provide ignition: by being heated to sufficient temperature, 
or by releasing a spark with sufficient energy to ignite gas. While the exact temperatures and 
energy levels required to ignite gas in practice differ widely depending on a range of factors 
such as gas composition, experimental geometry and laboratory conditions, the fundamental 
principles at work remain the same.  
This section is mainly based on /2/. An in-depth treatment of combustion theory is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but we will introduce a simplified view of ignition sufficient to consider 
the relationship between electrical equipment and flammable gases.  
Consider a volume V of an explosive gas mixture that is heated by some mechanism to the 
temperature  > , where   is the temperature of the surrounding gas outside of V. We 
assume the temperature T is uniform across V, and that the temperature drop  −  occurs 
suddenly at the outer limit of V. Consider then that the gas in V starts to react chemically 
giving off heat, with a reaction rate G(T) measured in Joule/s. This reaction will increase the 
temperature of V, and due to the temperature difference  − , heat will be transported from 
V to the surrounding gas at a rate of L(T). Now, whether ignition is achieved is determined by 
whether the rate of heat generation G(T), as T increases, is larger than the rate of heat loss 
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L(T). When sufficient temperature is reached, the combustion process in V will intensify and 
ultimately produce enough heat that the heat transfer to the surrounding gas becomes self-
sustaining. Therefore, the following conditions must be satisfied at the minimum ignition 
temperature for a given gas to be ignited: 
	 = 	 
and                                                                     [1]            
	 > 	  
This fundamental equation governs ignition, whether it is caused by a hot surface or an 
electric spark. It is however difficult in practice to determine G(T), L(T) or the geometry of 
the ignition zone.  
2.2.  Hot wires and surfaces 
The ignition mechanism of a hot surface is different from a spark ignition in that energy is 
imparted to the gas over an extended period of time. The autoignition temperature (AIT) for a 
gas is defined as the minimum temperature required to ignite the gas in air without a spark or 
flame being present. In theory, material that is heated to this temperature should ignite gas 
that it is exposed to. However, the AIT for a given explosive gas mixture cannot be regarded 
as a constant, but is strongly dependent on both the geometry of the ignition source and the 
dynamic state of the gas /2/. For a hot surface, convection currents around the surface will not 
allow a particular volume of gas to remain in contact with the surface long enough to reach 
ignition temperature, unless the surface is of a much higher temperature. The following 
experiment was cited in /2/: 
“When 114-mm-long nickel bars, 1mm thick and 12.5 to 25 mm wide were heated to ignite 
11% methane-air, the bar temperatures were 1,079ºC for the 25-mm width and 1,114ºC for 
the 12.5-mm-width. This is quite high relative to the ignition temperature of methane, 538ºC.” 
What can be taken from this is that in most realistic situations, the experienced AIT is likely 
to be higher than the experimental values cited in literature.  
2.3.  Electric sparks 
Electric sparks occur when the electrical field strength increases above the maximum that the 
dielectric medium can take, initiating a process known as breakdown. This leads to ionization 
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of the gas between the electrodes, causing the gap to conduct electricity and energy is 
discharged through the gap as if it were an ohmic resistor. The main difference is that this 
ohmic resistance is not constant for a given electrode gap and gas, but is reduced as the 
current in the gap increases /2/. The geometry, material and surface microstructure of the 
electrodes also influences breakdown voltage.    
There are two main modes in which sparks are generated by electric equipment /2/: 
• Arcing at closing contacts or between fixed electrodes in a capacitive circuit. Energy 
stored in the capacitor is released as contacts close or the gap between fixed electrodes 
breaks down. 
• Opening contacts in an inductive circuit. Energy stored in the inductor is released as 
opening contacts interrupts current in the circuit. 
In a similar manner to the way AIT is experimentally determined for different gases, 
minimum ignition energy (MIE) for a particular gas mixture can be determined using test 
apparatus. Also similarly to the case for hot surfaces, these referenced values tend to be 
conservative due to the test conditions – the turbulence and non-optimal electrode spacing 
found under realistic conditions result in higher spark energies required for ignition /2/. An 
upper bound for the spark energy  when closing a given capacitive circuit can be found by: 
  = 12  [2] 
 
and equivalently when opening contacts in an inductive circuit:  
  = 12  [3] 
 
where C is capacitance, U is voltage, L is inductance and I is current. These are derived by 
assuming that all of the energy in the circuit goes into the spark. 
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3.  Explosion protection 
3.1. General 
In the context of this paper, explosion protection is a term for a variety of techniques used to 
prevent electrical equipment from igniting gas. Equipment that has been constructed using 
these methods is generally referred to as Ex equipment and in this chapter we review the main 
types of Ex protection. This chapter is mainly drawn from /1/ and /2/. 
3.2.  Ex d – flameproof construction 
Several types of electrical equipment become hot enough or release sparks of sufficient 
energy to ignite an explosive mixture. A technique for operating these equipment types safely 
in hazardous areas is to provide an enclosure constructed in such a way that, if ignition does 
occur, the flame cannot propagate outside the enclosure and spread to the surrounding 
atmosphere. The enclosure is typically not vapor-tight, and one or several gaps (typically 
flanges) allow the outside atmosphere to penetrate the enclosure and vice versa.  For this type 
of protection to be effective, three main criteria must be satisfied: 
• The enclosure must be able to contain an internal explosion without damage 
• An internal explosion must not heat the outside of the enclosure so much that it 
becomes capable of igniting the outside atmosphere 
• An internal explosion must not be able to propagate to the outside atmosphere 
Items 1 and 2 above are satisfied through material choice and dimensioning the enclosure 
properly, while item 3 depends on the correct dimensioning of the gap separating the inside of 
the enclosure from the outside atmosphere. For a particular explosive gas mixture, the 
maximum experimental safe gap (MESG) can be determined. When ignition occurs inside the 
enclosure, the pressure inside increases, expelling a jet of hot gas through the gap(s). The 
MESG is the minimum gap distance at which quenching effects renders the gas jet unable to 
ignite the outside atmosphere. 
Ex d protection is typically used on control stations, motors, fuses, switchgear, pumps and 
power electronics /5/ and /6/. 
3.3.  Ex e – increased safety 
Unlike Ex d protection, increased safety devices are not designed to contain an internal 
explosion if it should occur. Rather it is apparatus that in normal operation is nonsparking, 
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and has been designed conservatively. When used within its ratings, any failure has an 
acceptably low probability of producing an ignition capable spark or hot surface. This 
includes short circuit and overload conditions. Typical requirements for Ex e apparatus 
include: 
• Creepage and clearance distances much larger than required for ordinary equipment 
• No part of the device may exceed temperatures corresponding to the marked T code 
during starting, normal operation or recognized overload 
• Increased attention to robustness compared to normal industrial equipment 
Ex e protection is normally used on motors, control panels, lights and junction boxes /5/ and 
/6/. 
3.4.  Ex p – pressurization 
Ex p protection uses a positive overpressure to prevent explosive atmospheres from entering 
an enclosure. The overpressure is required to be at least 0.5 mbar, and is maintained by 
continuously pumping in fresh air or an inert gas. When the system is designed correctly, this 
excludes an outside explosive atmosphere from penetrating the enclosure. Some requirements 
for pressurized enclosures are: 
• Intake of the protective gas supply must be placed in a nonhazardous location 
• Enclosure must be robust enough that accidents of foreseeable nature and normal 
conditions of use will not damage the enclosure such that positive overpressure cannot 
be maintained 
Ex p protection is most often used in cases when other types of protection are not suitable, 
due to its expense. Examples of use are control rooms, large instrument cabinets or large dc 
motors /5/ and /6/. 
3.5. Ex i – intrinsic safety 
In an intrinsically safe system, safety is afforded by the design of the system, not by the 
subsequent addition of protective measures. The system has been designed such that it is 
incapable of releasing sufficient electrical energy under normal or abnormal conditions to 
cause ignition. This is accomplished through strictly limiting the energy available to the 
circuit. Intrinsic safety is a term applied to systems (equipment and wiring), not to single 
devices. Key principles of intrinsic safety design include: 
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• Limiting the electric energy that can be stored in the circuit (capacitance/inductance) 
• Putting barriers in place to reduce the likelihood of a voltage higher than the rated 
voltage appearing at the terminals of the circuit 
• Fault tolerant design – the two subtypes of intrinsically safe systems are Ex ia and Ex 
ib. The former requires continued safe operation in the event of up to two independent 
faults, while the latter tolerates up to one fault. 
Due to energy limitations, intrinsic safety cannot be used for high power equipment. It is 
mainly used for measurement and control, automation technology, sensors and actuators /5/ 
and /6/. 
3.6. Ex m, Ex q and Ex o – encapsulation and immersion 
These three techniques are similar in the way that they prevent any spark-capable or heat-
producing parts of the equipment from coming into contact with the outside atmosphere, 
safety is provided by segregation. The three types are: 
Ex m – Encapsulation, also referred to as hermetic sealing. The ignition-capable parts of the 
equipment are embedded in a solid or semi-solid compound. Used primarily for small 
apparatus, instrumentation and control gear /5/ and /6/. 
Ex q – Powder filling. The electric parts of the equipment are surrounded by quartz sand or 
other inert powder. Any arc or spark within cannot cause a gas explosion even if some gas has 
penetrated the sand. Used primarily for capacitors and transformers /5/ and /6/. 
Ex o – Oil immersion. Here all ignition-capable components are immersed in oil to sufficient 
depth that they cannot ignite an explosive atmosphere above the surface of the oil. Used 
primarily for switchgears, transformers and magnetic contactors /5/ and /6/. 
These methods are not used as frequently on oil and gas installations as methods 3.1-3.4, but 
are included for completeness.  
3.7.  Ex n – non-sparking 
Ex n is equipment designed to not provide an ignition source in normal use, and covers a 
variety of protection methods. Equipment in this category often uses some of the techniques 
from 3.1 to 3.5, but fall short of qualifying for classification in those categories. The 
equipment is safe as long as it is operated within specified operating limits, but fault tolerance 
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is generally not built in. For that reason it cannot be used in hazardous areas classified as 
Zone 1 or Zone 0.   
 
4.  General model for ignition and ignition source isolation 
4.1. General 
The goals for setting up a general mathematical model of ignition source isolation in this 
paper are twofold; to gain an understanding of the processes involved, and to identify the key 
parameters that have to be estimated in order to study the phenomenon quantitatively. To 
assist with modeling, we define some assumptions and limitations. They are as follows: 
1. We consider a module that has been classified as a hazardous area on an oil and gas 
installation.  
2. The module has a large amount of equipment of different types, and any equipment 
that draws electrical power is considered an ignition source. 
3. Leaked gas is considered to be uniformly at its most easily ignitable concentration. 
4. Each ignition source is assumed to have two possible ignition modes: either by 
releasing an ignition-capable electric spark, or by being sufficiently hot to ignite gas. 
We label these modes as discrete and continuous ignition respectively. 
5. For a given ignition source, we assume that it has a certain probability of igniting gas 
in discrete mode per time step. Discrete ignition does not happen at the moment when 
the ignition source is exposed to gas, but is rather defined by certain failure modes in 
the equipment or randomly.  
6. Continuous ignition is assumed to happen immediately in the time step the ignition 
source is exposed to gas. 
7. Only equipment that is being operated is capable of igniting gas. 
8. When ignition source isolation is activated for an ignition source, it is turned off 
completely with no residual probability for igniting gas.  
The ignition probabilities of individual ignition sources are the building blocks for a larger 
model for ignition, so we first develop models for discrete and continuous ignition. Then we 
use these to model ignition source isolation and its effectiveness, and finally describe a small 
worked example of how the model could be applied.  
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4.2. Modeling discrete ignition 
First we examine ignition by electric sparks, and consider an individual ignition source. 
Assuming it has been exposed to flammable gas, two things must happen for it to ignite the 
gas:  
1. The Ex protection must be ineffective. We denote the probability of this occurring for 
ignition source 
 as _	
. Note that _	
 =  1 for unprotected equipment. 
2. An ignition-capable spark must be released. The probability of at least one such spark 
being released in a time step for ignition source 
 is denoted  !	
. This factor can 
be thought of as the intensity of the ignition source. 





 ∗  !	
 [4] 
 
Let us first consider the first factor on the right-hand size of this equation. For each Ex 
protected device, we assume there are $ distinct, known failure modes that cause the 
protection system to be ineffective. For each of these failure modes, three key parameters 
apply: 
Table 1: Parameters for failure modes, discrete sources 
Parameter Significance 
%&'	( The mean time between failures for failure mode ( )*	( The mean time before failure mode ( is detected, and presumably corrected by 
maintenance +	( The severity of failure mode (, the probability that this failure mode will cause 
the Ex-protection to fail to prevent an ignition 
 
Statistically, when the device has been in service for %&'	( hours, the failure mode ( 
occurs, and remains active for )*	( hours. We can see from this that the probability that 
failure mode ( will be active at a given time can be expressed as:  




It is sufficient that one such failure mode is active for the protection system to be ineffective. 
Therefore we can find _	
 indirectly by calculating the probability that no such failure 
mode is active: 
 
_	
 = 1 − 0	1 −123 ,-.	( ∗ +	( = 
1 − 0	1 −123
)*	(%&'	( + )*	( ∗ +	( 
[6] 
 
As a simple example, consider an Ex d protected electric motor. A known failure mode is the 
gap becoming expanded due to corrosion. Let’s say the MTBF for this failure is 7000 hours, 
and it is typically only discovered during periodic maintenance that occurs every 1000 hours. 
Therefore we set )* to 500 hours as an average value. If we further assume that this failure 
mode reduces the effectiveness of the protection by 50% and is the only possible failure 
mode, we then have: _	
 = 1 − 41 − 56676668566 ∗ 0.5< = 0.033. 
Now going back to equation [4], we investigate the ignition source intensity, that is the 
parameter  !	
, for discrete ignition source 
. The equipment can be thought of as 
having a certain probability of generating ignition-capable sparks in normal operation, 
without any fault conditions present. We refer to this, the probability that the ignition source 
will release a spark in a time unit of normal operation, as its background intensity:  !_>	
. For normally nonsparking equipment this value will be zero. Then there are a 
number of faults that could occur that have their own associated probability to produce a 
spark. These can be characterized by the parameters %&'	( and )*	( as was the case for 
failures in Ex-protection. We also need a parameter for the severity of the failure, that is, the 
resultant probability of spark release per time unit when the failure mode is active. We use +	( for this, even though the meaning is changed from the definition in table 1.  We are then 





∗ @1 − 	1 −  !_>	
 ∗ A0	1 −123





 is the percentage of time the equipment is in use, statistically.  
Further developing our example of the Ex d protected motor above, we look at a time step of 
one second and determine the following: The motor is used to drive a pump and is and has 
only 0.05 % chance of sparking per second of normal use. It is in use 10% of the time. 
Additionally, there is a failure mode associated with contamination of grease in the motor 
compartment. This results in 0.5% probability for a spark in a second. This failure mode is 
found to occur with a frequency of every 200 hours on average, and is typically detected and 
corrected within 12 hours. Ignoring any other failure modes, we get: 
 !	
 = 0.1 ∗ 	1 − 	1 − 0.05 ∗ D1 − 12200 + 12 ∗ 0.5E = 0.0077 
Equation [4] models the ignition probability for a single discrete ignition source per time unit 
of use, and for our electric motor example we would get: _"	
 = _	
 ∗  !	
 =0.033 ∗ 0.0077 = 2.5 ∗ 10GH. 
4.3. Modeling continuous ignition 
The main difference in modeling terms between discrete and continuous modes of ignition are 
that while the former is described by a certain probability of sparking in a time unit, 
continuous ignition is assumed to be instantaneous. We can however develop an expression 
for it in a similar way as was done in the previous chapter. For equipment to ignite gas via a 
hot surface, two things must happen: 
1. The Ex protection must fail.  This is the exact same _	
 as was used in 
equation [4]. 
2. A sufficiently hot surface must develop. We can define the percentage of time any part 
of the equipment is hot enough to ignite gas as I-	
. As previously, this can be 
termed the intensity of the ignition source. 
We then have the probability that a continuous ignition source 







   _	
 can be calculated as in equation [6]. An expression for I-	
 can be found 
using the same technique as was used to find  !	
 in the previous chapter. First we 
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consider the percentage of time the equipment gets hot enough to ignite gas in normal 
operation, this is the background intensity I-_>	
. Then any faults that could occur that 
have their own probability +	( of producing a hot enough surface must be taken into account. 
We then get an expression for I-	




 ∗ @1 − 	1 − I-_>	
 ∗ A0	1 −123
)*	(%&'	( + )*	( ∗ +	(BC [9] 
4.4.  Ignition source isolation 
In order to derive an expression for the reliability or effectiveness of ignition source isolation, 
we evaluate discrete and continuous ignition sources separately then combine the two. We 
assume that a hydrocarbon gas cloud is present in the module. The cloud has a volume J and 
is growing at a constant rate, exposing a new volume JKL in every time step. Our strategy 
will be to find the probability of the gas cloud igniting for two cases: 
1. Base ignition probability: no isolation of ignition sources 
2. Ignition probability after ignition sources have been isolated 
The effectiveness  of isolation can be derived by comparing the two. 
Let us define _"_--_  as the probability that the gas cloud will be ignited by a discrete 
source in a time step before isolation. We assume there are $ discrete ignition sources in the 
volume J. It is sufficient that one of them releases an ignition-capable spark for the gas cloud 
to be ignited in a time step. We can therefore calculate _"_--_  by using the same ideas 
as previously, and get: 
 _"_--_   = 1 − 0	1 −1M3 _"	
 [10] 
Then we look at _"_--_-, the probability that a discrete source ignites the cloud in a time 
step after isolation . There are three main component groups that must function correctly 
before an ignition source can be isolated in the event of a gas leakage. These are: 
1. Gas detectors. The gas must be detected, typically by at least 2 detectors, before there 
can be any ignition source isolation. We designate the reliability of gas detection as "-. 
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2. The emergency shutdown system. This covers all control system logic that takes a 
signal from the gas detectors as input, and sends out signals to shut down all 
equipment affected by isolation. We designate the reliability of the ESD system as ". 
3. The specific isolation mechanism, including relays, circuit breakers and any other 
components that must function for the ignition source to be isolated from power. The 
reliability of the isolation mechanism for a given ignition source 
 is designated 	
. 
Reliability in this context means the probability of correct functioning. We can use these 
factors to express the residual ignition probability for an ignition source 
 that has been 
subject to ignition isolation per time step: 
 
_"_ 	
 = 	1−"- ∗ " ∗ 	
 ∗ _"	
 [11] 
   
Then out of the $ discrete ignition sources in J, N are subject to ignition source isolation. We 
include the discrete ignition sources in JKL as well, but reduce their intensity by half to 
account for them only being exposed half of the time step, statistically. We assume these 
known through examination of ESD logic diagrams. We order them such that the first N 
ignition sources in $ are affected by isolation, so that ignition sources 1. . N are subject to 
isolation and ignition sources N + 1. . $ are not. We then get, by calculating the probability of 
no ignition happening in the time step and using the same principles as previously:  
 _"_--_- = 1 − 0	1 − _"_ 	





Due to continuous sources being assumed to ignite gas instantaneously upon being exposed to 
gas, this ignition probability is related only to the new ignition sources exposed to the gas 
cloud in a time step. The expressions become identical to the ones for discrete ignition, but 
here $ and N only relate to the ignition sources in JKL: 




 _,_--_- = 1 − 0	1 − _,_ 	





The effectiveness of ignition source isolation can then be expressed as the ratio of cloud 
ignition probability post- and pre-isolation as follows: 
 
 = 1 − 	1 − _"_--_- ∗ 	1 − _,_--_-1 − 	1 − _"_--_  ∗ 	1 − _,_--_   [15] 
 
4.5. Worked example 
We illustrate the usage of the model with a worked example from a small gas cloud. Assume 
we have a gas leak that in the first time step exposes the electric motor from chapter 4.2, 10 
light fixtures of the same model and 5 pressure transmitters of the same model. In this 
example J = JKL, so we reduce the discrete ignition probabilities by 50%. Again using a 
time step of 1 second, we have the following adjusted parameters: 







Motor 0.033 0.0038 0.013 1.3 ∗ 10GH 4.3 ∗ 10GH 
Light fixture 1.7 ∗ 10GQ 1.3 ∗ 10GH 6.3 ∗ 10GH 2.2 ∗ 10G7 1.1 ∗ 10GS 
Pressure transmitter 3.9 ∗ 10GQ 3.7 ∗ 10G5 0 1.4 ∗ 10G7 0 
 
The pressure transmitter is not found to be capable of continuous ignition. We can now 
calculate, for this time step:  
_"_--_   = 1 − 	1 − 1.3 ∗ 10GH ∗ 	1 − 2.2 ∗ 10G76 ∗ 	1 − 1.4 ∗ 10G75= 1.33 ∗ 10GH 
_,_--_  = 1 − 	1 − 4.3 ∗ 10GH ∗ 	1 − 1.1 ∗ 10GS6 = 4,4 ∗ 10GH 
The ESD diagrams for the installation shows that only the motor out of this group is affected 
by ignition source isolation. We now assume that "-, " and 	
 for the motor all 




	1 − 10GQQ ∗ 1.3 ∗ 10GH = 1.296 ∗ 10GH and _,_ 	
 = 	1 − 10GQQ ∗ 4.3 ∗ 10GH =4.287 ∗ 10GH for the motor. We can then derive: 
_"_--_- = 1 − 	1 − 1.296 ∗ 10GH ∗ 	1 − 2.2 ∗ 10G76 ∗ 	1 − 1.4 ∗ 10G75= 1.325 ∗ 10GH 
_,_--_- = 1 − 	1 − 4.287 ∗ 10GH ∗  	1 − 1.1 ∗ 10GS6 = 4,394 ∗ 10GH 
This allows us to calculate the effectiveness of ignition source isolation in this example as per 
equation [15]: 
 = 1 − 	1 − 1.325 ∗ 10GH ∗ 	1 − 4,394 ∗ 10GH1 − 	1 − 1.33 ∗ 10GH ∗ 	1 − 4,4 ∗ 10GH = 99.7% 
5.  Model discussion 
5.1.  General 
Now that the model has been described, we discuss its various features and limitations. Our 
simple worked example aside, using computer simulation is a practical necessity if using it in 
more realistic scenarios where hundreds or thousands of ignition sources must be considered. 
If we know the necessary parameters for all ignition sources in the module and their 
coordinates, along with the layout and geometry of the module itself, we could run 
simulations with various leakage rates, leakage sources and weather conditions to establish 
values for the effectiveness of ignition source isolation.  
This chapter examines the assumptions that form the framework for the model and gives some 
suggestions on how the different parameters needed could be established. As mentioned in the 
introduction however, our main interest in developing this model was for use in risk analysis. 
We therefore discuss how it could be simplified so that it could be of practical use in the 
context of a quantitative risk assessment. 
5.2.  Model assumptions 
Now we examine and discuss the assumptions behind the model, to be able to evaluate its 
realism and applicability. Some assumptions are explicitly stated, but there are other 
underlying ones that are requirements for our model to be valid. We will go through these as 
well and consider how the model would look if they were removed.  
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In the model we consider electric sparks and hot surfaces as the only two ways by which the 
gas cloud can be ignited. For the purpose of evaluating ignition source isolation, which 
ultimately only applies to electric equipment, it was considered sufficient to include these two 
ignition modes. In reality there are several other possible ignition modes, ranging from the 
credible (friction sparks) to the more esoteric (adiabatic compression) /1/. The calculated 
ignition probabilities can therefore not be considered general, but only apply to ignition by 
electric sparks and hot surfaces. It would however be a simple task to extend the model to 
include friction sparks or other ignition phenomenon by using the same principle of failure 
mode evaluation as was extensively used in chapter 4. 
Assumption 3 in chapter 4.1. states that gas is uniformly considered to be at its most easily 
ignited concentration. This is a typical convention in risk analysis, as it is the worst case 
scenario in terms of ignition probability and therefore yields conservative estimates. A real 
gas cloud will be more highly concentrated close to the source of the leak and less so on its 
outer edges, and will also depend on leak rate and turbulence in the module.  
Assumption 6 in chapter 4.1. states that continuous ignition occurs instantaneously when the 
equipment is exposed to gas. A more accurate description of hot-surface ignition would be 
that there is a certain induction time before ignition occurs, depending on the temperature and 
geometry of the hot area, and the turbulence in the surrounding area. For extremely high 
temperatures, the induction time will be so low that instantaneous ignition is a reasonable 
approximation. It is perhaps more likely though that a hot surface will have a temperature 
somewhere between the stated autoignition temperature from literature and the temperature 
required for instantaneous ignition. The results from experiments on autoignition temperatures 
and induction times vary significantly with experimental setup and lab conditions, and no way 
has been to analytically relate the different contributing factors /2/. Convection currents work 
against delayed ignition from hot surfaces, which is why this author thinks instantaneous 
ignition is a reasonable approximation for the model. 
Related to this is the assumption that a continuous ignition source has no residual ignition 
probability after it is turned off via ignition source isolation. The hot surface might take some 
time to cool after the equipment is isolated, depending on the hot material, its geometry and 
area conditions. As stated above, delayed ignition from hot surfaces is judged to be a small 
risk, especially so if it is cooling. If we wanted to include this effect in the model we could 
use an exponential decay function to model cooling of continuous ignition sources, halving 
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their individual ignition probabilities after a certain amount of time. Rather than just looking 
at JKL, we could go back a certain number of time steps and include the adjusted ignition 
probabilities for continuous sources that were exposed to the gas cloud in the past.  
The model assumes that only equipment that is being operated can be considered an ignition 
source. There may however be failure modes that make the equipment capable of sparking or 
becoming hot even if that is not the case. This is not necessarily a problem for the model, such 
failure modes must be carefully evaluated along with any others, but their ignition 
probabilities should be divided by ?	
 for equation [7] to give accurate results. 
An underlying assumption behind the model is that the failures in the Ex protection of an 
ignition source can be considered independently from failures leading to sparks or hot 
surfaces. This may be the case for the Ex protection categories that can be thought of as 
barriers that are  separate from the potential ignition sources inside and works by segregating 
them from the potentially explosive atmosphere outside. Recall from chapter 2 that this is not 
the case for Ex protection categories e and i. Ex e is protection by conservative design and 
high safety factors, while Ex i is protection by energy limitation in the design. We can 
incorporate this in the model by considering _	
 as a failure probability for the 
physical barrier between the equipment and an explosive atmosphere, and thereby set _	
 = 1 for equipment protected by either of these two Ex categories. Then any 
failure modes that could result in ignition can be included in  !	
 and/or I-	
  as 
normal.  
Another assumption that is not explicitly stated is that the various failure modes in the 
equipment can be considered independent. We state that each failure mode for a single 
ignition source has its own independent probability of occurring and results in its own 
probability for creating a spark or hot surface. The reality on a physical installation is that 
there are a high number of interdependencies, and something that causes a fault in one 
ignition source may also cause a fault in or affect the ignition probability for others. A local 
power spike for instance could affect all the equipment powered from the same source. As 
accounting for all such potential interactions would be a huge task, we consider this 
assumption of independence as an acceptable simplification for modeling purposes. 
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5.3. Model parameters 
We now go through the parameters used in the model, and discuss methods that can be used 
for establishing them. These parameters are not physical constants that can be measured with 
instruments, and estimating them depends on engineering judgment and access to 
maintenance records. The basis for this model is having a lot of data on each individual 
ignition source in the gas cloud, and doing a thorough study to find all the potential failure 
modes that could cause it to become ignition-capable. A technique like FMECA (failure 
mode, effects and criticality analysis) /8/ could be used. For each of these failure modes, %&'	(, )*	( and +	( must be estimated.  
%&'	(: Available reliability data from databases such as OREDA /9/ could be helpful in 
estimating this. Otherwise detailed maintenance records from the installation or expert 
opinion can be used. Note that the age of the equipment will likely influence this variable as 
well. 
)*	(: Knowledge of the maintenance regime on the installation is necessary. Three main 
factors will go into it: the probability that the failure mode will be discovered outside of 
periodic maintenance, how often the equipment is subject to periodic maintenance, and the 
probability of detecting the failure mode during periodic maintenance. If the failure mode is 
not considered to be detectable, )*	( can be set equal to the expected remaining life of the 
equipment or remaining life of the installation, whichever is shorter. Personnel with 
operational experience from the installation will be a good source for much of this 
information. 
+	(: This is perhaps the most difficult to evaluate of the three parameters that define a failure 
mode. The method by which this failure mode increases the likelihood of an ignition must be 
examined in detail. In cases where such data is not available, it would be safest to set +	( =1. 
When all parameters for the various failure modes have been established for a particular 
ignition source, ?	
 and  	
 for that equipment must be estimated. 
?	
: This will typically be easily determined from operational records. One must keep in 
mind though the specific scenario we are evaluating. Take the example of a firewater pump 
for instance. Going by the percentage of time the equipment has been used in the history of 
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the installation is not wise in this case, because firewater pumps are typically turned on as 
soon as gas is detected. Therefore its ?	
 is likely to be close to 100% for our purposes.   
	
: Determining this will depend on how the ignition source isolation is implemented 
electrically. It is likely to be a series of electrical components such as circuit breakers or 
relays that all must work for isolation to take place. Using reliability data for these 
components, 	
 can be calculated. 
Finally we have "- and ": 
"-: The two main things to consider are the probability of gas detector malfunction, and the 
probability of the gas cloud reaching at least two gas detectors. Reliability for a single gas 
detector can be easily found from datasheets, but whether the gas cloud exposes enough 
detectors is scenario dependent. For a large or medium release it may be safe to assume that 
enough detectors were exposed, but for smaller releases we would most likely have to 
perform simulations to properly establish this. 
": There will generally be a large degree of robustness and redundancy built into the 
design of this system, so probability of failure is most likely not significant. The system will 
SIL rated, which can be used to put a value to this reliability. 
5.4. Using the model in risk analysis 
While using a detailed model such as described here might be necessary to assess the 
reliability of ignition source isolation with a high degree of accuracy, estimating all the 
required parameters for an entire module of process equipment is an undertaking that is far 
beyond the scope of a quantitative risk assessment. A model to be used for such a purpose 
must use a comparable level of detail in order to be of practical value. We therefore examine 
in this section how the model we have developed can be simplified to provide useful input to 
risk analysis.  
The most obvious way to do this is to move away from calculating all the parameters for each 
specific ignition source, but rather to find results applicable to broader categories. In our 
model in chapter 4, we calculate _	
 for an individual ignition source. If we assume 
that the different types of Ex protection have similar failure modes with similar attributes 
according to their Ex type, then we only need to find _	
 for each of the Ex categories 
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once. A detailed study could be done into common failure modes for each Ex category, and 
once this is in place, we have usable estimates for _	
 for all protected equipment.  
Similarly, we could evaluate  !	
 and I-	
 by groups according to equipment type 
rather than for individual ignition sources. For instance, we could analyze the common failure 
modes that could result in high-voltage electrical motors in general becoming ignition-
capable, and use these calculated values for  !	
 and I-	
 for all such electrical 
motors. If categorization is performed in this way, the task at hand becomes a much simpler 
one. Provided that care is taken not to use overly broad categories, the results should still be 
reasonably accurate.   
6.  Data review and analysis 
6.1. General 
An important part of this project was to attempt to obtain quantitative data that could be used 
to establish parameters in our model. In this chapter we present the results of this data search. 
Four main data sources were considered: 
1. Literature on technical safety and explosion protection. 
2. Manufacturers of Ex equipment. It was considered that these companies could be 
good sources for failure data on Ex barriers as well as on specific equipment used in 
the industry. 
3. Technical safety consultants. These were thought to have knowledge of any previous 
studies and existing data dossiers that could be used.   
4. Oil and gas operators. These companies should have maintenance records from their 
installations that could be used to analyze failures in Ex equipment. 
Most of what was found would fall into the category of qualitative statements, which cannot 
be used directly for setting parameters. Examples include: 
• A manufacturer of Ex lighting says that they do not receive much failure data from 
their customers on their products, but that a typical failure mode for their Ex d and Ex 
e light fixtures is water ingress into the equipment. They further state that the most 
likely cause of this is poor or inadequate maintenance procedures.  
• A chairman for a technical committee for standardization of Ex equipment says that he 
is unaware of any quantitative data related to ignition from Ex protected equipment. 
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However he states that the greatest risks are associated with equipment that is not 
installed or operated in accordance with manufacturer specifications or not maintained 
properly.  
• Another member of this committee who works with inspection of Ex equipment states 
that the most common failures they find for Ex e equipment is improper termination 
and damage from moisture.  
While information of this type is useful for developing an understanding of what failures can 
occur and what the main risk factors are, we want to focus on quantitative data that can be 
applied on our model. The only data of this nature that was found was from two sources. The 
first was found during a literature study, and is applicable to the failure probabilities of 
different Ex types. The second is a large data set from a maintenance project on an oil and gas 
development in the Norwegian sector. In this chapter we first review and discuss the 
applications of the data from first source, then do the same for the data set from the 
maintenance project.  
6.2. Benjaminsen and van Wiechen data 
/2/ is a reference book on electrical instruments in hazardous location. In a chapter outlining 
possible quantitative approaches to safety, work by Benjaminsen and van Wiechen is 
referenced. They published a series of papers between 1967 and 1969 attacking safety 
problems using probability theory. One of their goals was to be able to do a quantitative 
comparison of different protective techniques commonly used. While this author has been 
unable to find their original papers, some of the results are presented in /2/. They quantified 
the MTBF for electrical equipment by protection type, and specified MTBF as a mean time 
between failures that make the equipment ignition-capable rather than failures that cause loss 
of function. The relevant values they used are reproduced here: 
Table 3: MTBF for failures in Ex protection per Benjaminsen and van Wiechen 
Protection type MTBF (hours) 
Flameproof (Ex d) with flanged joints, windows or direct entry of cables 10S 
Flameproof (Ex d) with threaded joints or indirect cable entry 107 
Flameproof (Ex d) with housings of very small volume which are not 
repairable 
10X 
Nonincendive (Ex n) 10H 
Pressurized (Ex p) 10S 
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Increased safety (Ex e) 107 
 
They also suggested some values for )* for nonsparking apparatus: 
)*  =  1000 hours for failures that are difficult to detect, such as loose rotor bars in squirrel 
cage motors, loose connections, broken outer bulb of high pressure mercury lamp. 
)*  =  0.1 hour for failures that will be removed by overload protection 
)* = 0.01 hour for failures that will be removed by short circuit or earth fault protection 
6.3. Benjaminsen and van Wiechen data analysis 
The MTBF values used by Benjaminsen and van Wiechen apply directly to the probability of 
a failure occurring that causes the Ex protection to be ineffective. The exact failure modes are 
not specified, but we do not need that in order to use the data. We must then assume that this 
MTBF value for a particular Ex type represents all possible failure modes that cause loss of 
protection. In terms of our model, we get for an ignition source 
: 
 _	
 = ,-.	( = )*	(%&'	( + )*	( [16] 
 
Let us use the example of an Ex d protected ignition source that has flanged joints and direct 
cable entry, and that its failure is non-obvious. Using their suggested values of  %&'	( =
10S hours and )*	( = 10Q hours, we get: _	
 = 6Y6Z86Y = 9.9 ∗ 10GH. 
Whether using common failure probabilities for all equipment protected by the same type of 
Ex barrier is a good idea is a separate discussion from whether Benjaminsen and van 
Wiechens proposed MTBF and )* values should be accepted. Leaving the former aside, we 
consider the validity of their proposed values.  
The main questions are around how these values were derived. As we do not have their 
research available, we are not in a position to review their methodology directly. However 
their research is over 40 years old at this time, and it seems likely that reliability in safety 
technology has progressed since then. Assuming their MTBF values were reasonably accurate 
average values at the time, this makes them conservative today, which is usually regarded as 
beneficial in risk analysis.  
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Typical values for )* are not likely to have changed in the same way, and their proposed )* 
of 1000 hours for non-obvious failures seems low. Assuming the Ex failure does not impair 
the functioning of the equipment, the fault may not be discovered at all or only when the 
equipment is opened up and inspected internally. This could be performed as rarely as every 
other year. Therefore it seems prudent to use knowledge of the specific maintenance regime to 
establish )* values to be used across the whole installation. 
6.4.  Data from oil and gas development in the Norwegian sector 
While most operators in the Norwegian sector either had no suitable data for this project or 
declined to contribute any, one of the larger operators shared data from a project they ran on 
one of their installations that was aimed at discovering failures that could cause Ex protection 
to be ineffective. 
This was a project that ran from four years from July 2005 and covered several platforms on 
the same oil and gas field. It was a series of planned maintenance operations that specifically 
targeted Ex equipment and evaluated whether the Ex protection was effective. In order for 
maintenance personnel to be able to make these judgments consistently, a technical document 
was prepared that listed inspection criteria for each of the Ex types. The inspection was 
largely visual in nature. 
Across the platforms on this oil and gas development, there were about 25000 tags or single 
pieces of equipment that were Ex protected and subject to inspection as part of this project, 
and throughout its lifetime 53911 individual inspections were recorded. This means that some 
equipment was inspected more than once. Equipment either passed or failed inspection, 
partial or impaired protection was not considered.  
Attached to this report is both the raw data from the inspections extracted from SAP and the 
technical document containing inspection criteria, appendices A.2 and A.3. Ignoring the 
categories that have 10 tests or less, we have: 
Table 4: Tests and faults in data from maintenance project 
Equipment type Number of tests Faults found Fault percentage 
Lighting 10743 115 1,07 % 
Junction boxes 10449 70 0,67 % 
Unspecified 9840 41 0,42 % 
Heating 5866 75 1,28 % 
Fire and gas 2975 17 0,57 % 
Instruments 2207 26 1,18 % 
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Low voltage motors 1947 38 1,95 % 
Loudspeakers 1898 3 0,16 % 
Emergency stops 1781 29 1,63 % 
Electrical sockets 1472 9 0,61 % 
Switches 1160 12 1,03 % 
Field telephone 807 26 3,22 % 
Motor starter 631 17 2,69 % 
Valves 430 2 0,47 % 
Actuators 329 0 0,00 % 
Misc. Electric 268 4 1,49 % 
Control panels 230 0 0,00 % 
CCTV 178 2 1,12 % 
Manual switch 166 0 0,00 % 
High voltage motors 139 1 0,72 % 
Distribution board 114 5 4,39 % 
Control system 93 1 1,08 % 
Measurement station 78 1 1,28 % 
Pedestal crane 29 0 0,00 % 
Fog horn 16 1 6,25 % 
        
Sum total 53846 495 0,92 % 
 
6.5.  Analysis of data from oil and gas development 
First let us review what is known and unknown about the data set from this project: 
Table 5: Known and unknown information about data set from maintenance project 
Known Unknown 
• The total number of individual tags / 
equipment pieces that were subject to 
inspection (25000) 
• How many inspections were made on 
each equipment group and how many 
of each group passed or failed 
inspection 
• For some of the failures, there is a 
brief description of the nature of the 
failure. 
• The criteria the equipment was 
• The distribution of the equipment into 
equipment groups. That is, how many 
junction boxes, low-voltage motors 
etc. were there. 
• The Ex type of inspected equipment 
• The type or severity of most of the 
faults that were discovered 
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measured up against (see attachment) 
• How long the program ran (4 years) 
 
Recall from chapter 4 that _	
 can be considered to express the probability that the Ex 
barrier will be ineffective when tested for a given ignition source. Thus if a sufficiently large 
number of tests of the Ex barrier was performed, it stands to reason that the ratio of the 
number of failures to the number of tests would approximate _	
. The data we have 
here is in the form of tests and failures, so is at first glance suitable for use in this way. The 
first question that needs to be answered is then: what is a sufficiently large number of tests? 
This question is statistical in nature. Ideally we would want to categorize the equipment by Ex 
type, as the failure probability should be related to the type of Ex protection. This is unknown 
however, so we must rather categorize by equipment type and assume that all equipment of 
the same type has a similar probability of Ex protection failure. If we want to use basic 
statistical theory from /3/ to analyze the data, we must make a couple of assumptions: 
• Failures are independent, random events. 
• All inspections of an equipment type can be considered instances of the same event, 
that is, all junction boxes for instance are inspected the same way.  
Then we can present the data from table 4, removing the entries that had no experienced 
failures and ones of unspecified type and including the margin of error (ME). We also include 
an estimate of _	
 assuming that a reported failure means that the Ex protection is 
completely ineffective: 
Table 6: Confidence interval and computed _	
 for maintenance project 
Equipment type # of tests # of failures Fault % 95% conf. ME (+-) _	
  
Lighting 10743 115 1,07 % 0,20 % 1,27 % 
Junction boxes 10449 70 0,67 % 0,16 % 0,83 % 
Heating 5866 75 1,28 % 0,29 % 1,57 % 
Fire and gas 2975 17 0,57 % 0,28 % 0,85 % 
Instruments 2207 26 1,18 % 0,46 % 1,64 % 
Low voltage motors 1947 38 1,95 % 0,63 % 2,58 % 
Loudspeakers 1898 3 0,16 % 0,18 % 0,34 % 
Emergency stops 1781 29 1,63 % 0,60 % 2,23 % 
Electrical sockets 1472 9 0,61 % 0,41 % 1,02 % 
Switches 1160 12 1,03 % 0,59 % 1,63 % 
Field telephone 807 26 3,22 % 1,24 % 4,46 % 
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Motor starter 631 17 2,69 % 1,29 % 3,98 % 
Valves 430 2 0,47 % 0,66 % 1,12 % 
Misc. Electric 268 4 1,49 % 1,48 % 2,97 % 
CCTV 178 2 1,12 % 1,58 % 2,70 % 
High voltage motors 139 1 0,72 % 1,43 % 2,15 % 
Distribution board 114 5 4,39 % 3,84 % 8,22 % 
Control system 93 1 1,08 % 2,14 % 3,21 % 
Measurement station 78 1 1,28 % 2,55 % 3,83 % 
Fog horn 16 1 6,25 % 12,10 % 18,35 % 
 
This table should be read as follows: For lighting for instance, this implies that we can be 
95% certain that the actual fault percentage is within the interval 1.07 ± 0.20 %. The last 
column is a conservative estimate for _	
 for that equipment type taken by adding the 
experienced fault percentage to the margin of error – we can be 95% confident that _	
 is this value or lower. The above estimates of _	
 illustrate the difficulty 
of using statistical methods to make inferences with a high degree of accuracy on smaller data 
sets. It is clear that the high margins of error relative to the experienced failure probabilities 
limit the usefulness of some of these estimates.  
Another important question about this data set is what a reported failure constitutes exactly. 
Clearly it failed inspection, but we have to review the failure data or inspection criteria to be 
able to determine whether this necessarily represents a completely ineffective Ex barrier or 
just an increased risk that it will fail. A cursory review of the failures where the nature of the 
failure was detailed reveals the following examples: 
• Three low-voltage motors failed due to water entry into the housing, two others failed 
due to large amounts of rust found on the motor. 
• Two junction boxes failed due to missing the screw and bracket for the lid. 
• Several magnetic instrument valves failed due to being rusted shut and impossible to 
open. 
• Two field telephones failed because their loudspeakers did not work. 
These examples show that the failures reported in this data set do not necessarily mean 
missing or significantly impaired Ex protection. It seems that in many cases an item failed 
inspection if its Ex protection required maintenance. Using a _	
 calculated on the 
basis that an inspection failure means ineffective Ex protection, as was done above, is not 
likely to give realistic ignition probabilities for this installation. It should also be noted that 
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equipment classified as Ex i was not subject to inspection as part of this project as per 
appendix A.3. This explains the relatively low number of instruments inspected across the 
installations, as most of these are likely classified as intrinsically safe.   
7.  Discussion and conclusion 
7.1. General 
This chapter aims to tie together the discussion from previous chapters, and contrasts the 
results from the different data sources. Finally some concluding remarks are presented along 
with suggestions for further work. 
7.2. Discussion 
The model developed in chapter 4 has a level of detail and requires a level of effort when 
calculating parameters that it is not practical to use every time one wants to estimate the 
effectiveness of ignition source isolation in a module on an oil and gas installation. That is not 
its intended use. Rather what could be done is to use the described method of failure mode 
analysis to find representative values of _	
 for the protection techniques used in the 
industry. The same method can be used to compute I-	
 and  !	
 for a range of 
typical equipment types found in process areas.  
If we have a database populated with typical values such as this, estimating the effectiveness 
of ignition source isolation becomes a much easier process from case to case. Granted, 
simulation will still be required in a module with thousands of individual equipment pieces, 
but one would not have to go through the exercise of estimating every single parameter. 
There are some risks associated with foregoing individual analysis, but if the database is large 
enough one should be able to find equipment there that is equivalent or close enough in terms 
of ignition probability. Some of the data required for the model cannot be sourced from a 
database though, we still need the following: 
• An overview of the different ESD levels and shutdown logic for the installation in 
question, so that we know which equipment is affected by ignition source isolation. 
• Material detailing how ignition source isolation is physically carried out. This is most 
likely done in a similar way for all ignition sources, so we can set 	
 =  
across the installation. 
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The second major part of this project was to search for data that could be used to populate 
such a database of ignition probabilities as was described above. Unfortunately this effort was 
only partially successful, but we go through the data it to highlight its potential use. 
The data cited by Benjaminsen and van Wiechen does apply directly to _	
. The 
values they use seem reasonable, but without seeing how it was derived we would hesitate to 
recommend using it except as comparison data to check computed values of _	
. 
The data from the oil and gas development is interesting, but the fact that it is not organized 
according to Ex type makes it difficult to apply to general use. One way to relate it to Ex 
types would be to make a series of assumptions about the Ex type of each of the equipment 
categories, such as assuming for instance that all junction boxes are of type Ex d. We would 
hesitate to recommend this approach, as it is bound to dilute the information value of the 
material. Another way to use it would be to organize our database of  _	
 values by 
equipment type rather by Ex type. In that case the data would fit right in, but as the values of _	
 are likely to depend far more on the Ex type than on the equipment it is used on 
this cannot be recommended. 
Another aspect of this material is that the reported failure rates are quite high compared to the 
assumptions of Benjaminsen and van Wiechen. A possible explanation for this is that the 
MTBF values used by Benjaminsen and van Wiechen are supposed to represent mean time 
between loss of safety function, while the failures reported in the maintenance project do not 
necessarily represent loss of function for the Ex barrier.  
No data was found to support any quantification of I-	
 and  !	
 for common 
equipment types. We do not think there is any easy way to get data such as this, there is 
probably no way around having to performing the analysis work and going through the failure 
modes of the equipment.  
7.3. Conclusion and further work 
The three objectives stated when the original problem statement was written were 
unfortunately not achieved.  The first part, developing the model, was performed successfully. 
However due to the limited availability of data, it was not possible to set up a database of 
weighting factors as was envisioned without doing a lot of guesswork. And again, not having 
enough material for this database precluded performing the last part in the problem statement; 
doing a practical test of the model applied to an actual module on an oil and gas installation. 
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We had intended to use the same module from the Skarv FPSO that was subject to analysis in 
the Fall 2009 project, as this was the only dataset available. Still the project should not be 
considered a failure. Important groundwork was done in establishing a model that can be used 
to calculate the effectiveness of ignition source isolation, and further work can be done based 
on this foundation. 
The obvious way to go forward is to populate the database described in the previous section. 
By organizing a broad-participation industry project and getting experts familiar with design 
of Ex equipment involved as well as personnel with experience from maintenance, one should 
be able to perform credible analysis of the failure modes leading to ignition for the most 
common types of process equipment.  
Another way to populate the database would be to design a maintenance project similar to the 
2005-2009 project detailed in this report. If the maintenance personnel were specifically 
trained in what to look for and suitable equipment tests devised, we could get failure data 
keyed to both Ex types and equipment categories. For a statistically significant number of 





Appendix A (on CD) 
 
A.1. Programs.txt, programs and version numbers used in project 
A.2. Excel spreadsheet: “Oseberg sss23 530” 
A.3. Word document: “Ex-utstyr, tennkildekontroll” 
A.4.  Word document “Project report”, this report 
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